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 Resumo/Abstract: 
It is said that economics value individual and economic freedom and from that many hastily conclude that 
mainstream economics value human rights. The purpose of this paper is to show that on the contrary 
mainstream economics is fundamentally contradictory with many human rights especially Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights. The main reason for this is that mainstream economics and human rights have trouble 
in communicating, the latter speaking the rights language and the former the needs language. Within the 
needs language, capability to pay is the key question whereas within the rights language, entitlement is. If 
in the first case exclusion and inequality are acceptable in the second case the only acceptable situation is 
the one characterized by inclusion and equality. In other words goods and services can be unequally 
distributed, rights cannot. For this reason one cannot count on the market alone to ensure economic, social 
and cultural rights. Therefore, considering the introduction of different logics into the economic equation as 
unbearable interferences with economic logic, mainstream economics stands against human rights. In 
order to give a better illustration of this contradiction the particular conflicts between economics and the 
right to work, the right to water and the right to social security will be presented. The main conclusion of this 
paper is that in order to favour human rights economics should either suffer a paradigmatic revolution or 
accept to play just a supporting role in the process of global development. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Human rights are, undoubtedly, one of the most influential and fruitful concepts 
of modern times and by many of the planet’s poor and oppressed considered the 
miraculous lenitive that will bring them that justice and dignity indispensable to dress 
up their ephemeral earthly existence. Despite the probable controversy of the following 
statement I strongly believe that, in its essence, economics is supposed to aim at exactly 
the same purpose. How can one explain, then, why economics and human rights seem to 
have been divorced for quite a while? It makes very poor sense, indeed, that the two 
concepts which, I dare say, have contributed the most to free human kind, human rights 
from fear and economics from need, should stand apart from one another. Besides the 
fact that they share a common object, human rights and economics are yet otherwise 
intimately connected. On the one hand, one must admit that asserting human rights 
demands economic means, and on the other hand efficacy and efficiency of the agent’s 
economic decisions presupposes a significant degree of liberties. There is, therefore, an 
economic dimension to human rights as much as a human rights dimension to 
economics. 
 
 The main reason for this unjustifiable divorce seems to be the fact that 
economics and human rights do not share the same language. Indeed, one can seldom 
find the concept of human rights within economic reasoning with the remarkable 
exceptions of its explicit incorporation of property rights and its implicit references to 
freedom of speech. Both these rights constitute essential pillars of economic rationality 
as there is no such thing as personal interest without property rights and, although 
history has given us many examples of an unnatural cohabitation of economic liberty 
and political repression, I firmly sustain that separating rational choice from freedom of 
choice and, therefore, from freedom of speech, is unconceivable. Following this line of 
thought, other rights, namely economic and social rights, should be treated likewise. 
Indeed, one may legitimately question the substance of the individual’s right to choose 
when facing the possibility of death because of a lack of economic means to obtain 
medical treatment. To its own advantage, nevertheless, economics prefers to concentrate 
on merely satisfying needs, solvable needs one should add, rather than to exhaust itself 
by trying to capture human rights into its theoretical body. 
 
 
NEEDS VERSUS RIGHTS 
 
 One must admit that economic theory feels more comfortable dealing with needs 
rather than with rights. Within economic analysis satisfying needs implies the use of 
concepts like cost, benefit, and price, and therefore, the issue at the bottom is capability 
to pay, in other words purchasing power. With rights, on the other hand, the issue is 
quite different; the heart of the matter here concerns entitlement, the criteria according 
to which an individual should qualify to enjoy rights, purchasing power being obviously 
excluded, and the consequences of the use of such criteria. Furthermore, whilst dealing 
with needs economics can take shelter in a positivist approach; dealing with rights, on 
the contrary, pushes it to risk normative stands, adding supplementary embarrassment to 
economics’ traditional insight. 
 
 In traditional economic theory efficiency and equity are dealt with separately. 
Whereas efficiency, being essentially a technical issue, can be approached through 
positive analysis, equity, on account of its value judgement content, demands a 
normative approach. This separation has been severely questioned by many economists 
for a long time, but the fact is that economic resources can be unequally allocated 
without economic efficiency being the least troubled. As a matter of fact, from a 
normative liberal standpoint, inequality is perfectly compatible with social justice as 
long as the least favoured layers of a community can better their living conditions, as it 
ensues from the wording of John Rawls’ second principle of justice (Rawls, 1972). 
Besides inequality, economic efficiency can also tolerate exclusion of individuals from 
the distribution of resources when fastened by tight budget constraints. 
 
 None of this is tolerable when rights are at stake. Rights, if they are to be fully 
taken as rights, must be equally allocated amongst all those entitled to enjoy them 
within the community. Basic liberties, for instance, do not admit another allocation than 
an equalitarian one (see Rawls, 1972). Indeed, one cannot accept that some individuals 
may deposit more votes in the ballot box than others. Needless to remind that universal 
suffrage, confers one, and only one, vote to every citizen of age. Beyond the legitimate 
statutory exceptions, basic liberties do not admit exclusion either. If a citizen is 
arbitrarily excluded from participation in an election, this means not only that he was 
denied his right to vote but also that the right to vote is not ensured in the community to 
which he belongs, even if all except one are allowed to participate in the voting. Indeed, 
rights are either guaranteed for all or they aren’t for none. 
 
 Thus, the introduction of human rights, namely economic, social and cultural 
rights, into the economics theoretical body, forces economics to adopt an unnatural 
behaviour, for to accept rights should mean to accept that the allocation of many goods 
and services must not forcibly observe market distributive rules. Economic efficiency 
does not oppose to this when public goods and services are concerned; but satisfying 
rights, economic and social rights in particular, goes way beyond the definition of 
distributive rules referring only to public goods and services. It regards private goods 
and services also, as determined by article 11 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) which declares the right of everyone to 
an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, 
clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. As a 
simple private good, housing, for example, can be unequally distributed and can 
contemplate exclusion, that is to say homelessness. As a right, housing not only 
demands a distribution such as nobody is deprived of a shelter, but also that some basic 
qualitative criteria must be met, normative issues which traditional economics is 
unwilling to address. 
 
 Another aspect that can enlighten us on the divorce between economics and 
human rights is the fact that there is an institution within which vocabulary equity and 
inclusion can be found; the State. Indeed, one of the State’s functions is to promote 
equity and inclusion in the allocation of its resources; therefore, the introduction of 
human rights language in economics means that the responsibility for the process of 
private goods and services’ allocation might have to be transferred from the market to 
the State. Well, given that traditional economics abhors State intervention, seen as an 
unbearable interference with the market, one shouldn’t be surprised if economics ends 
up displaying a notable distaste for a concept which contributes, precisely, to legitimise 
such interference. 
 
 
UTILITY VERSUS RIGHTS 
 
 Within traditional economics the individual seeks to maximise his utility 
function, in other words he looks for the highest income possible. Considering all 
humans alike, this same traditional economics interprets social utility as the sum of 
individual utilities, the utility of the community being, therefore, measured by national 
income. This calculation system, despite being theoretically contested by many 
economists, has obtained, nevertheless, a recognition that overcomes the orthodox 
versus heterodox methodological fracture. Within this system it is perfectly 
conceivable, either from a formal or a moral point of view, that disutility, or negative 
utility, for an individual, may end up not only not affecting social utility but even 
contributing to raising it. Indeed, in Europe, since the 1970s, despite unemployment 
having been multiplied by a factor of three, meaning that many workers saw their 
individual utility being considerably reduced; national income, in other words social 
utility, kept growing vividly almost everywhere. 
 
 The introduction of the rights language, on the contrary, radically changes the 
common welfare function. Indeed, depriving an individual from a particular right, or 
simply reducing its enjoyment, affects negatively the entire community. As opposed to 
utility, the degree in which a right is guaranteed cannot be measured by the sum of the 
number of individuals enjoying it, but rather by the degree in which the purpose of that 
right is guaranteed for every individual. Therefore, the degree of democratic 
participation, for instance, cannot be measured by the number of individuals benefiting 
from the right to vote, but rather by the extent of the decisions that are submitted to the 
scrutiny of all. As we have seen before arbitrarily denying an individual the right to vote 
is equivalent to denying it to the whole of the community; even if, taken one by one, no 
other citizen seems to be affected. In this case, thus, arbitrary individual deprivation of 
the right to vote not only affects the maximisation of democracy but can also represent a 
deprivation of democracy for the community as a whole. In this sense seeking for the 
maximisation of utility can be conflicting with promoting human rights. 
 
 A very well-known legal dilemma in the United States (see Harvey, 2002) 
perfectly illustrates the essence of this conflict. In the beginning of spring 1841 an 
American ship collided with an iceberg when crossing the North-Atlantic, and rapidly 
sunk leaving 41 passengers and crew members squeezed in a precarious lifeboat. In 
spite of the lifeboat being overcharged the crew managed to keep it afloat for 24 hours 
thanks to favourable weather conditions. However, the following day these conditions 
got worse and began swamping the lifeboat hopelessly. Then, fully convinced that this 
precarious craft would soon sink and drag every castaway into the frozen depths of the 
ocean, the officer in charge of the lifeboat ordered the crew members to throw 
overboard every male adult unaccompanied by their wives. Fourteen men, and two 
women that chose the same fate as their brothers, were sacrificed. Thus relieved, the 
lifeboat resisted to the inclemency and by the following dawn all the remaining 
passengers were rescued by a ship passing at a distance. 
 
 From the strict utilitarian point of view, the officer involved limited himself to 
maximise social utility given the constraints in terms of the lifeboat’s capacity and the 
weather conditions. The only alternative left to him was keeping every passenger aboard 
the lifeboat and condemn the lot to be swallowed by the liquid fury, depriving all, and 
not just a few, from their certainly very much esteemed life expectations. Comparing 
both solutions’ final degrees of utility, sacrificing sixteen passengers was perfectly 
legitimate, therefore. From the rights point of view, however, the outcome is manifestly 
contrasting. Indeed, the sacrificed passengers were not only deprived of their lives but 
also of their right to live, and consequently the rescuing of the remaining passengers 
could be considered a criminal act. That is exactly what happened in this story when the 
survivors were brought ashore. Anticipating all the legal complications their decision 
might bring them, all crew members fled, with the exception of one, who ended up 
being taken to court and sentenced to six months in prison for manslaughter. 
 
 The judge who pronounce the verdict, nevertheless, considered that the officer’s 
procedure could have been legitimate had he taken one of two options, the first being 
that members of the crew could have been sacrificed instead of passengers, this being 
interpreted has the fulfilment of a duty, and the second that the sacrificed could have 
been either voluntary or picked by drawing lots. In both these cases, the attempt on the 
victims’ lives could have been acceptable from a rights point of view. Indeed, I strongly 
believe that voluntary renunciation to the right to live often constitutes a substantive 
assertion of this same right much more eloquent than its protection. It is the case of all 
those that in the course of history have died for causes they manifestly valued more than 
their own lives. 
 
 The verdict pronounced by the judge and his comments reveal that, at the 
bottom, it was not the result of the officer’s decision that was condemned, but the 
process that led to it. In other words it was not the maximisation of social utility, the 
sacrifice of passengers, that was illegitimate, but the arbitrariness of the process through 
which the victims were picked. Bear in mind that both the officer’s behaviour and the 
alternatives proposed by the judge are equivalent in terms of the result. This result, 
though, can be valued differently whether one looks at it from the point of view of 
social utility or from the point of view of individual rights. In the court’s verdict social 
utility constitutes a perfectly legitimate goal but under no circumstances it should 
overrule human rights. 
 
 On a different register, but sharing the same matrix of the above mentioned 
dilemma, Jean Paul Fitoussi, in a seminar on Social Europe that took place in Lisbon in 
1997, declared that if the economic model was to be maintained, Europe could only 
become richer, in other words increase social utility based on the aggregation of 
individual income, if a non negligible part of its population would accept to become 
poorer. From the point of view of the maximisation of utility such a path could be 
admissible, but Fitoussi added that the consequent inequality could be intolerable from 
the point of view of justice and politically unsustainable from the point of view of 
democracy. In such circumstances the liberal quest for the maximum of wealth appears 
to be contradictory with some of the basic injunctions of human rights’ philosophy. 
 
 
ECONOMIC PROBLEMS VERSUS RIGHTS VIOLATION 
 
 Despite its positive approach to facts economics never considered people’s 
deprivation as some of sort of fate, the result of things being what they are. Deprivation 
was rather the outcome of either nature’s random behaviour or human’s incompetence. 
In other words deprivation resulted either from nature playing people nasty tricks or 
people being incapable of making the right decisions. The search for the good life 
signified, therefore, a struggle to dominate nature, or to predict and mitigate its whims, 
and a quest for efficiency in human action. The rhetoric of human rights, in contrast, 
introduces a substantially different approach to deprivation by transforming economic 
problems into possible rights violations, that is to say into discriminations or structures 
that prevent people from exerting rights (Offenheiser and Holcombe, 2003: 275). 
 
 Within the economic problems language one may have to surrender to the 
insolubility of deprivation; on the contrary, within the rights violations language 
deprivation is not inevitable and, therefore, there is no reason for tolerating it. The high 
level of unemployment, for instance, ceases to be seen as a fate weighing on the 
economies, a lesser wrong or a bitter macroeconomic instrument, becoming rather an 
attempt on human rights, taking Riccardo Petrella (2004) into saying that involuntary 
unemployment, thus, should be considered illegal. Furthermore, the idea of rights 
violation sends us to responsibility, in other words to identify its source, sharply 
contrasting with the anonymous and unaccountable character of decentralised economic 
decisions taken in the market. Indeed, if an individual, through his actions, deprives 
another individual of its welfare the former is accountable before him or a court of law; 
none of this occurs, however, in a problem based economic logic, revealing another 
contradiction, therefore, between economics’ and human rights’ languages. 
 
 As a matter of fact this discussion also stems from the justiciability debate 
regarding economic and social rights. Some consider that economic and social rights are 
only rights in manifesto sense and, therefore, are not justiciable and cannot be treated as 
individual legal claims, in other words they do not constitute a duty for others (see 
Donnely, 2005). In this sense the right to work can only be treated as a solemn 
statement of an important policy goal, implying at the most political responsibility only. 
For some others (see Canotilho, 1984; Queiroz, 2002, Freeman, 2004,) on the contrary, 
rights are always justiciable and, therefore, economic and social rights presuppose a 
duty for the community even if it is accepted that the realization of these rights could be 
in some way restrained by the availability of means. 
 
 In the economic problems language, therefore, full employment, for instance, 
would be the outcome of a fortunate conjugation of fruitful effort and nature’s 
generosity, rather than of a claim’s pressure. In the same spirit, universal suffrage, to 
take another example, is very often considered not just a demand of democracy but a 
windfall of economic progress. In 1968, slightly after a successful military coup, an 
Argentinean government official told Albert O. Hirschman that only once the country 
had attained economic stability and a certain level of economic growth would it be 
ready for the reinstatement of civil liberties (Hirschman, 1988: 112). Thus, in claiming 
for the universal suffrage one should not appeal to justice but rather engage into creating 
the conditions for economic progress. 
 
 The difference regarding the sense of the causality reveals another clash between 
economics and human rights, this time about the way humans are considered in the 
process of meeting their needs. Indeed, when facing human welfare, rights language 
takes the individual as a legitimate petitioner whereas economics is more inclined to 
take him as being a creditor of a reward, a lucky winner or even a beggar. By putting 
emphasis on entitlement, human rights discourse empowers all individuals in their 
struggle for the good life, whereas putting the emphasis on skills, hazard or kindness, 
economics can contribute to legitimate potential exclusion of individuals, taken to be 
unfit, unlucky or plainly undeserving, from the enjoyment of a dignifying life. 
 
 
AVAILABILITY OF MEANS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
 The argument, according to which the realisation of economic and social rights 
is costly and, therefore, depends on the good performance of the economy, finds an 
unexpected ally in the very text of economic and social rights proclamations. In article 2 
of the ICESCR, for instance, it is said that: 
 
 1. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and 
through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to 
the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, 
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures 
 
 This article’s content is likely to be interpreted in many different fashions and 
some do not hesitate to consider this ductility an unequivocal manifestation of economic 
and social rights’ frivolity, especially when compared to civil and political rights. First 
of all, the availability of means clause constitutes a severe obstacle to economic and 
social rights as a loose interpretation of this clause can be used to justify disregarding its 
realisation. Indeed, there are no criteria determining the minimum level of available 
means necessary to guarantee these rights. Consequently it is impossible to define 
objectively which rhythm of rights implementation is compatible with signatory-states’ 
compromise (see Chapman: 2005) or which level of resources implies which rhythm of 
implementation. 
 
 If rights seem to be hindered by an availability of means clause, economics 
cannot live without it, though. The economic basic problem consists in the impossibility 
of satisfying immediately every human need not only because needs seem infinite but 
also because this satisfaction is constrained by the availability of resources. By 
introducing an availability of means clause, rights are objectively placed on the same 
footing as needs, and, thus, not only one is complied to accept the fact that rights might 
not be guaranteed to everybody, as we have seen above, but also that some rights might 
no be guaranteed at all. 
 
 The separation between negative and positive rights also contributes to this 
attributed frivolity of economic and social rights. Positive rights demand from society a 
positive intervention, in other words the provision of goods and services, which means 
bearing a cost. To ensure negative rights, on the other hand, one just needs non-
objection from society, meaning that no cost is supposed to be involved in guaranteeing 
these rights, and therefore that they are not submitted to any sort of availability of 
means clause. Ensuring the right to property would, therefore, be exempted from 
mobilising resources as opposed to ensuring the right to social security, for example. 
Consequently economics can easily take negative rights as formal constraints and, 
therefore, insert them as so in its welfare function. On the contrary, taking positive 
rights as an outcome of this same welfare function, economics deal with economic and 
social rights as dependent variables. 
 
 There would be nothing wrong with this handling of rights if ever this distinction 
could be relevant. It is not true that what are usually considered negative rights do not 
involve a mobilisation of resources In other words it is absolutely fallacious to claim 
that there is no cost involved in ensuring negative rights. Indeed, does it occur to anyone 
in his right mind that one can guarantee an individual the right to a fair trial by simply 
not opposing to this same individual having a fair trial? Negative rights are submitted as 
much as positive rights to an availability of means condition, then. The insistence on the 
availability of means clause of economic and social rights, to which one should add 
progressiveness in its implementation, sharply contrasts, with their absence in the 
proclamations of civil and political rights, reinforcing the idea that guaranteeing 
economic and social rights is not, whatsoever, an obligation of society, but at the most a 
mere happy consequence of expanding economic resources. 
 
 There are clearly two weights two measures in dealing with rights, revealing a 
manifest bad will, to say the least, as far as implementing economic and social rights is 
concerned. The Chairperson of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
during the Vienna Conference in 1993 passed on this idea stating that:  
 
(we continue) to tolerate all too often breaches of economic, social and cultural rights, 
which if they were committed against civil and political rights, would provoke 
expressions of horror and outrage and would lead to concerted calls for immediate 
remedial action. In effect, despite the rhetoric, violations, of civil and political rights, 
continue to be treated as though they were far more serious, and more patently 
intolerable, than massive and direct denials of economic, social and cultural rights” (in 
Albuquerque, 2005: 2). 
 
 To help us grasp more vividly the varied shades of the contradiction between the 
economic and the human rights discourses, the conflict between economics and the 
rights to social security and to work will be slightly more thoroughly discussed in the 
following lines. The starting point of this discussion concerns the demands of article 3 
of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) which states that everyone has 
the right to life, liberty and security of person. 
 
 
ECONOMICS AGAINST THE RIGHT TO SOCIAL SECURITY 
 
 If all humans are born free and equal in dignity and rights, as it is declared in 
article 1 of the UDHR, inequalities in the access to goods and services necessary to 
support the right to life can only be due to natural inequalities that determine different 
needs. The major inequalities that prevail in society do not stem from this logic, though. 
Inequality in the access to health does not stem from poor people’s lesser needs but 
from poor people’s lesser purchasing power. The same happens with income 
inequalities in the old age, they do not stem from any natural discrepancy in the natural 
degradation of the capability to work of the poor in relation to the rich, but from the 
inequality of income accumulation during their respective lifetimes. 
 
 Social security, then, consists in a correcting mechanism of the inequalities 
imposed by society to humans with the purpose of bringing them closer to the natural 
state of equality. It should be stressed that one shouldn’t mistake social security with 
social assistance. The inequalities referred above, therefore, do not include all 
inequalities but only those perceived before the uncertain, the misfortune, or in the case 
of old age, the inevitable. 
 
 Thus, in article 22 of the UDHR it is proclaimed that: 
 
Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to 
realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance 
with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural 
rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.  
 
In article 9 of the ICESCR, in turn, it is stated that:  
 
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to social 
security, including social insurance. 
 
 In contempt of this general recognition, economics does not internalise social 
security as a necessity but rather as a constraint. Indeed, several objections to social 
security can be found in the economics discourse, the most common amongst these are 
its alleged excessive cost and the consequent loss of competitiveness imposed on the 
economies. Friedrich von Hayek went even farther in his objection to the very idea of 
social security arguing that it would jeopardize other rights considered more important. 
He claimed that freedom is threatened every time the State arrogates itself the power to 
exclusively supply certain services, because this would imply a redistribution of income 
and, therefore, an undue expropriation of the individual (Hayek, 1960: 289-290). 
 
 Despite the fact that Hayek’s argument perfectly fitted the orthodox economics 
discourse, the alleged attempts of social security on fundamental rights did not take as 
much as he would expect, even amongst liberal economists. From the 1970s on the 
arguments against social security insisted mainly on the idea of it being a burden for the 
economy. In May 2006, during a meeting of the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights of the United Nations, the regional vice-president for Europe of the 
International Organisation of Employers, Michel Barde stated on social security that 
any model had to conform to the socio-economic realities of a country and that there 
had to be a balance between the resources needed for social security and the need to 
maintain employment, competitiveness, and economic growth (CESCR, 2006). 
 
 Firstly, it absolutely amazing that one can consider social security to be too 
expensive today when this system was born after the second world war in a ruined 
Europe, and that income per head has been multiplied by three between 1950 and 1980 
(Bairoch, 1986: 393) and again by the same factor since then in the OECD countries 
(UNDP, 2000: 181). Even if wealth had stagnated this argument could hardly sustain 
the expensiveness critique. Amartya Sen shows how, in the United Kingdom, progress 
in life expectancy during the twentieth century did not result from increasing wealth but 
from political options. Indeed, the strongest increases in life expectancy of the civilian 
population happened precisely while the United Kingdom displayed the lowest rates of 
economic growth coinciding with both world wars. According to Sen these progresses 
were obtained thanks to the social transformations allowed by the wave of national 
cohesion and solidarity produced by the state of war, consubstanciated in raising public 
expenditure directed to social services (Sen, 1999). It is, indeed, hard to conceive what 
the United Kingdom managed to achieve during the most dramatic periods of its 
twentieth century history as being a luxury in times of peace and unequivocal 
prosperity? 
 
 Secondly, as Paul Krugman (1994) has shown the concept of competitiveness 
applied to nations is senseless. A company can be competitive because it is by nature 
ephemeral; but a nation, even when it transforms itself into another nation, is not 
ephemeral, it simply does not vanish, except in the case of a cataclysm. A nation as 
opposed to a company does not cease its activity. According to Krugman, this 
“corporatisation” of nations is not only a mistake but also a danger because it leads 
policies into the wrong direction. Furthermore, from a global point of view, growing 
national competitiveness for all in world markets is a mathematical impossibility as 
there cannot be only nations that export more than they import. Indeed, at a given 
moment in time exports must forcibly be globally equal to imports, in other words all 
national trade surpluses must match all national trade deficits; therefore, a strategy 
resting on national competitiveness is senseless. Even if one considerers the hypothesis 
that there may be global winners and losers, trade surpluses do not forcibly make global 
winners and, in turn, trade deficits do not automatically make global losers. 
 
 Thirdly, the much propagated trade-off between competitiveness and social 
security has no unequivocal empirical support. According to the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) there is a strong positive correlation between expenditure in social 
protection and high labour productivity (ILO, 2005: 7). As one knows a correlation can 
be interpreted in several manners. One can say that social expenditure stimulates rather 
than hinders high productivity, but one can also state that it is high productivity that 
allows high social expenditure and, therefore, that it is abusive to take social 
expenditure as a productivity enhancer. The above mentioned correlation allows an 
undeniable conclusion, though, which is that the alleged trade-off between social 
protection and labour productivity does not exist. Indeed, high labour productivity is a 
good indicator of economic efficiency which in turn is a good indicator of 
competitiveness. Therefore, even if one feels reluctant to accept that social expenditure 
enhances competitiveness one should at least recognise that obliging people to choose 
between social protection and competitiveness is a fallacy. 
 
 All these objections to social security fall within what Albert O. Hirschman has 
called the rhetoric of reaction, a set of arguments regularly put forward to counteract 
social progress since the nineteenth century. The first argument of this rhetoric sustains 
that every action directed at improving a given aspect of the political, social and 
economic order ends up aggravating the situation that it was supposed to correct; the 
second that every attempt to transform social order is vain and the third that the cost of 
these reforms is too high (Hirschman, 1991). 
 
 This standpoint shared by a majority of economists stems from a biased and old 
fashioned interpretation of the social. Indeed, within mainstream economics the social 
has always been seen as a by-product, a happy consequence, even a palliative, of the 
economic. According to this philosophy the economic designates the set of activities 
submitted to profitability and the social, in turn, the set of operations implemented to 
correct the intolerable human costs of market economy that will eventually affect this 
same profitability (Bartoli: 1996). Thus, social redistribution is only possible by means 
of a good performance of the economy. In the hierarchy of spheres the social comes 
after the economic, it depends of the economic. The social becomes, then, some sort of 
cession accepted by the economic as the outcome of a peculiar diplomatic game which 
the market appears to be playing with the people. 
 
 
ECONOMICS AGAINST THE RIGHT TO WORK 
 
 Although there are several references to the right to work from 1848 on (see 
Harvey, 2002), it was not until 1948 that, in the surge of the discussion about universal 
human rights by the recently created United Nations Organization (UN), the right to 
work got explicit general recognition as a human right. In article 23 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) it is proclaimed that: 
 
1. Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable 
conditions of work and to protection against unemployment. 
(…) 
3. Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring 
himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented if 
necessary by other means of social protection. 
 
 This proclamation clearly states not only that people have the right to a job but 
also to a decent job. Furthermore, people have the right to protection against 
unemployment, which should be understood as a set of mechanisms protecting an 
individual from becoming unemployed and not only from the consequences of being 
unemployed. In other words, not only should he have the right to a monetary 
compensation for being out of a job, for example, but also that he is entitled to some 
kind of job security. 
 
 Concerning the right to work, the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), approved by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations in December 1966, proclaims the following: 
 
Article 6 
 
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right to work, which 
includes the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work which he 
freely chooses or accepts, and will take appropriate steps to safeguard this right. 
 
2. The steps to be taken by a State Party to the present Covenant to achieve the full 
realization of this right shall include technical and vocational guidance and training 
programmes, policies and techniques to achieve steady economic, social and cultural 
development and full and productive employment under conditions safeguarding 
fundamental political and economic freedoms to the individual. 
 
Article 7 
 
The State Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right to everyone to the 
enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work which ensure, in particular: 
 
(a) Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with: 
(…) 
(ii) A decent living for themselves and their families in accordance with the provisions 
of the present Covenant. 
 
 There are two main dimensions to the right to work in both the UDHR and the 
ICESCR. The first one is quantitative and sustains that the right to work means the 
existence of sufficient jobs for everyone, not only the right to compete on terms of 
equality for scarce employment opportunities (Harvey, 2005: 9; Canotilho, 1984: 35). It 
is not incidentally that The United Nations Charter, drafted in 1945, proclaims in article 
55 that the United Nations shall promote “Higher standards of living, full employment 
and conditions of economic and social progress and development”. The second 
dimension of the right to work is qualitative and regards those criteria that determine 
whether a particular job qualifies as decent work. These criteria sum up what could also 
be called the rights of an individual at work and concern wages, working hours, 
working conditions, the right to join and form unions to protect one’s interests, and so 
on. Different policies are usually demanded to secure each of these dimensions, and 
although trade-offs between them could be expected, asserting the right to work should 
not tolerate them. That is why some public action aiming to just create jobs may not 
qualify as right-to-work securing policy if it despises the rights at work. 
 
 The first contradiction between economics and the human right to work regards 
the fact that according to traditional welfare economics too much concern for rights 
could lead to the pursuit of policies that reduce rather than enhance human welfare, and 
in the particular case of unemployment, instead of creating jobs, would end up boosting 
unemployment. The argument is based on the perverse effects on welfare of pursuing 
notions of fairness (see Kaplow and Shavel, 2003). 
 
 Stating that strict adherence to principles such as the right to work would have a 
perverse effect on the ability of society to provide everyone with a job could possibly be 
demonstrated. The present paper is not the place to analyze the perversity argument in 
depth, though. Nevertheless, constituting an important pillar Hirschman’s (1991) 
rhetoric of reaction it calls for a general comment. In relation to the quantitative aspect 
of the right to work, the debate on employment policies is very vivid and has not 
reached unanimous conclusions on which policies have contributed to creating jobs and 
which have not. But with respect to the qualitative aspect of the right to work, the rights 
at work, the validity of the perversity argument would mean that legislative measures 
that have been implemented in many countries around the world should have worsened 
the working conditions of the population. This argument seems simply preposterous. 
Albert O. Hirschman reminds us that in the nineteenth century, universal suffrage, one 
of the pillars of modern political rights, was also accused by many of having a perverse 
effect on democracy (Hirschman, 1991). 
 
 Another sort of opposition of economics to the right to work stems from the 
presupposition that guaranteeing jobs for all would mean an unbearable amputation of 
the right to property, an inviolable principle of mainstream economics. According to the 
liberals during the discussion of the French constitution of 1848, the state should be 
responsible for the eventual implementation of the right to work, and on account of the 
fact that the state doesn’t have proper resources, the enforcement of the right to work 
would have to be done through taxation and inevitably the proprietors would end up 
paying it (Tanghe, 1989: 167). In this view the right to work is considered an 
amputation of the entrepreneur’s income, and Pierre Joseph Proudhon himself says that, 
if profit becomes null, proprietors lose their interest in property, and if property is 
discouraged, property vanishes (Proudhon, 1938: 431). 
 
 The right to work would be an attempt on property, then, because it would 
diminish its profitability. In the nineteenth century the reduction of working hours, a 
qualitative aspect of the right to work, was attacked by Nassau Senior on the grounds 
that profit was obtained during the last hour of the working day and that, therefore, any 
reduction in it would end up suppressing profit (see Marx, 1977). More recently, the 
employers’ reaction to paid vacations also brought the argument of diminishing 
profitability. However, economic history has showed not only that general profitability 
did not suffer from the reduction of the working hours and paid vacations, but also that 
new forms of property were developed as a result of increased leisure. 
 
 This contradiction between the right to work and the right to property can be 
above all understood in the light of the conflict between capital and labour. The first 
aspect of this conflict concerns the contradiction between labour considered as a 
productive factor and labour taken as end or an asset. The second aspect of this conflict 
regards the microeconomic and the macroeconomic role played by unemployment. In 
the traditional economic system, labour is both a productive factor and an end. It is a 
productive factor that along with capital participates in the production of value and it is 
an end in the sense that in compliance with the moral code of economics (see Branco, 
2006) one has an obligation to work. On one hand, in order to maximise social utility 
through consumption, society should aim to supply the largest amount of jobs possible. 
On the other hand, firms in order to maximise their profits have to focus on minimising 
the use of productive factors, and, therefore, should aim to supply the smallest amount 
of jobs possible. There is, therefore, a conflict on which are the worker’s and the firm’s 
utilities. 
 
 The second aspect concerns the role that unemployment has been called to play 
in order to regulate microeconomic and macroeconomic variables. The microeconomic 
aspect of this conflict concerns the fact that for firms, unemployment is useful in 
attaining certain objectives. For a long time, unemployment, and the spectrum of 
hunger, has been seen as an explicit menace to workers in order to make them work 
harder and stay in line (see Linhart, 2006; Méda, 1995; Kalecki, 1971). In this respect 
the recent model trying to explain unemployment as a result of what has been called 
efficiency wages is nothing but a modern version of unemployment as an instrument to 
promote workers’ discipline. In this case, involuntary unemployment may appear to be 
a nuisance for the workers, but for firms it may be considered, on the contrary, as quite 
a productive device (Borjas, 2005: 503-504). Furthermore it appears that, according to 
empirical studies, wages tend to be lower in regions where the unemployment rate is 
high and vice versa, giving unemployment another important role in containing the 
firm’s costs (Borjas, 2005: 504). 
 
 In a sort of extrapolation of this last role, from the micro level to the macro 
level, the famous Philips curve argued that there was a long run trade-off between 
inflation and unemployment. Some economists like Milton Friedman and Edmund 
Phelps contested the nature of that relationship, but not its principle, and considered that 
in the long run there seems to be an equilibrium unemployment rate, called Natural Rate 
of Unemployment (NRU), which persists regardless of the rate of inflation (Borjas, 
2005). The more modern version of the NRU takes a slightly different stand, 
considering the NRU an economic equilibrium that, if reached by the economy, allows 
inflation to remain constant (Devine, 2004), or in other words a rate of unemployment 
where inflation does not accelerate, this being called Non Accelerating Inflation Rate of 
Unemployment (NAIRU). 
 
 In one version or the other the principle is the same. Unemployment appears to 
be an instrument in controlling inflation and full employment is no longer a goal. The 
trade-off between unemployment and inflation embodies, therefore, a conflict between 
labour and capital. Workers are interested in the lowest rate of unemployment possible 
and capitalists are, on the contrary, specially interested in the lowest rate of inflation 
possible. The Philips curve and the natural rate theory of unemployment, in any of its 
versions, becomes, then, a clear theoretical and practical manifestation of the capital-
versus-labour goal conflict, and more precisely the conflict between labour and financial 
capital, as inflation is supposed to affect primarily financial interests (see Kalecki, 
1971). 
 
 Well, stable prices may be a strong preference, revealed eventually by a major 
part of the population, but it cannot aspire, whatsoever, to the same status as a 
recognized human right. In this case it seems clear that within economics and public 
policy intervention the preference for stable prices outweighs the human right to work. 
Writing about the funding of human rights, Norberto Bobbio says that the origin of the 
right to work and the right to property is historically determined by the nature of the 
power relations that characterized societies in the midst of which these claims were 
made. In a society where only the proprietors had active citizenship, it seemed obvious 
that the right to property should be taken as a fundamental right, and in the same way, 
as industrialization developed and the workers movements made their appearance, it 
became obvious that the right to work should be considered a fundamental right 
(Bobbio, 1992: 77).  
 
 If the fact that after the great depression of the 1930s and until the 1980s priority 
was given to fighting unemployment could, partly, be the manifestation of a shift in 
democracy, from a democracy of the proprietors towards a democracy of the workers 
(see Pinilla, 1989: 61), the fact that, on the contrary, fighting inflation appears 
nowadays to be more important in public policy suggests that the weights of the scales 
have been inverted. Incidentally, the fact that economic literature has never talked about 
such a thing as a Non Accelerating Unemployment Rate of Inflation (NAURI) is 
revealing enough of which of the conflicting sides has captivated the more interest from 
economic research. Not only has capital, and especially financial capital, recovered its 
supremacy, but economic orthodoxy has also produced a discourse conveying the idea 
that labour rights clash with what has generally been called economic freedom, and that 
outstripping its condition of a mere clause for the efficiency of a particular regulatory 
system, freedom of the market has been upgraded to a fundamental right by this same 
orthodoxy (see Cunha, 1998). 
 
 
FOR THE FUSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND ECONOMICS (CONCLUSION) 
 
 We have seen that for economics ignoring human rights, in other words simply 
unfolding its logic regardless of any other, is equivalent to denying them. Well in a 
democratic society economics cannot ignore human rights, not only would it be 
senseless, but also it would be harmful to its own purposes. But can it integrate them? 
When dealing with rights economics can basically take one of two approaches. The first 
option consists in taking rights as a constraint within which choice is made (see 
Weikard, 2004: 267), the second option in assuming rights as an integral part of 
normative economics, and in this view exercising rights is just another manifestation of 
making a choice. 
 
 Along the lines of the first option, economics can roughly adopt two secondary 
approaches that may be actually contradictory. On the one hand, economics can look for 
resolving its maximisation problems considering human rights as primordial and, on the 
other hand, economics can take human rights as an insupportable constraint rendering 
the maximisation exercise unattractive, obliging, consequently, people to choose 
between human rights and economic efficiency. The first attitude respects human rights 
although it does not the scare away the spectre of a paralysing conflict between both 
logics. The second attitude, on the contrary, contributes to hinder human rights with 
such arguments as them being too costly. 
 
 This is a most convenient, although biased, approach as most of the time 
economics only considers part of all the costs related to human rights. Indeed, if many 
economists, with some cynical intemperance even, devote themselves to calculate the 
costs of social security, for instance, with the confessed goal of demonstrating society’s 
incapacity in paying the price of utopian policies, very few are those that, according to 
the same principles, are coherent enough to also calculate the costs of the inexistence of 
social security, revealing, thus, the ideological bias which, hiding under the mask of 
analytical rigour, dictates the alleged frivolity of economic and social rights. 
 
 Human rights also generate benefits though these are harder to monetise and 
consequently harder to handle within the typical cost benefit confrontation dear to 
economics. However, even if this confrontation could produce tangible results, cost and 
benefit could never be the basic criteria for the integration of human rights and 
economics. Human rights altogether were not born from any evidence revealed to the 
individuals through some kind of positive reasoning like unequivocal demonstration of 
the social utility maximisation obtained through its adoption. Human rights resulted 
from a normative reasoning according to which individuals considered a dignified 
existence impossible to reach without them. Thus, the choice individuals are called to 
make does not concern whether human rights should be adopted or not given the 
economic system; but which is the most favourable economic system given the adoption 
of human rights. In a democratic society if the human-rights option collides with a 
definite system of economic rules, it is necessary, then, to enrich this system and modify 
its rules. 
 
 In its seminal work, Ronald Dworkin (1978) considers human rights, essentially, 
as a mechanism protecting minorities from decisions taken by majorities in their profit 
but resulting in prejudice for the former. This means that the enrichment of one part of 
the world cannot be pursued at the expense of the material, cultural and spiritual 
impoverishment of another part, especially if this constitutes its weakest link. Asserting 
economic rights cannot, therefore, be taken as an equivalent to maximising utility, better 
said social utility cannot be mistaken with aggregate utility. This clearly tells us that 
economic goals must be rephrased. Take production. Indeed, producing one particular 
commodity having in mind the satisfaction of demand or the assertion of human rights 
does not mean the same although this enterprise might be undertaken in a similar 
fashion. 
 
 Within economic mainstream thought, meeting effective and viable demand is 
satisfying enough as a social role for the producer, and that part of the population which 
in consequence is deprived of access to this commodity on account of budget 
constraints should not be of concern. On the contrary, in the case of human rights 
assertion through the supply of this same commodity no one should be left out, 
regardless of budget constraints. On the one hand one is meeting private demand, 
because its nature is mainly individual, and on the other hand one is meeting a public 
demand because, in contrast, its nature is now mainly social or collective. Well, 
according to corporate logic, meeting private demand is a normal procedure whereas 
meeting public demand is not. 
 
 The essence of the conflict between economics and human rights also resides in 
the ways the political and the social are apprehended. As Henri Bartoli (1996) states the 
social and the politic should be taken as the territories where major social choices are 
made rather than those where the conflicting natures of the economy and the society are 
expressed. It is important to stress that I believe a cohesive and sympathetic society is as 
important for the both the economy and human rights as courts and the market. 
Therefore, aiming at the integration of human rights, economics’ methodology, needs to 
shift from the concept of satisfying individuals to the more inclusive concept of 
satisfying all the individuals. In other words economics should return to its basic 
purpose of being at the service of the people instead of demanding people to be at its 
service or as Robert Hamrin (1989) puts it, commanded instead of commanding. 
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